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BOOK REVIEWS 
rationalities would prepare people better to interact internationally. 
Macintyre' s argument for the inclusion of western rationalities would seem 
to imply that we should also construct universities ~t ~ open to ~on­
westem rationalities. Yet the western concept of ratiOnality as craft nught 
be inappropriate to judge eastern or native rationalities. . .. 
What would it mean to bring rival western and non western rationalities 
intoouruniversities? Feyerabend has suggested that medical schools should 
study traditional medicine as well as western medicine. H instructors in 
eastern traditional North American, and homeopathic medicine join medical 
faculti~ then future doctors would have a greater selection of remedies from 
I ' 
which to choose. Relegating native medicine to anthropology puts its 
healing power beyond our reach. . . . 
Are there any options that one should exclude from a umv~ty of 
dialogue and disputation? This is a hard question. I prefer the politically 
correct exclusion of creationism since I don't see creationisn\as good science; 
yetitmightbestudiedinotherdepartments. But a truly pluralistic university 
should include all rationalities, especially those practiced by many members 
ofitsownsociety. Iamthereforeinadilemmaoverthebreadthof a truly open 
university devoted to disputation and understanding. Macintyre' s .Three 
Rival Versions Of Moral Ent1Uiry is a clever and wide ranging contribution to 
the debate over the purpose of contemporary universities. It successfully 
pushes us out of the institutions imprisoned by outmoded Victorian 
pedagogical structures into the debates that are emerging from actual 
conditions in contemporary social life. 
John Inglis, Lexington 
Matthew H. Kramer. Legal Theory, Political Theory, and Deconstruction: 
Against Rhadamanthus. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 199L 
A text is not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first 
glance, the law of its composition and the rules of its gan:ie.· A text 
remains, moreover, forever imperceptible. Its law and its rules are 
not, however, harbored in the inaccessibility of a secret; it is simply 
that they can never be booked, in the present, into anything that could 
rigorously be called a perception. 
Jacques Derrida. Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981, p. 63. 
100 disCloswe Fall 1991 
BOOK REVIEWS 
Matthew H Kramer's first book is one in which Derrida's quote is taken 
at full value. Working his waythrough particular texts, theories, and thinkers 
from the traditions of legal and JX>litical theory, Kramer is constantly at pains 
!o make per.ceptible the strategies in.the work he examines by showing why 
1t must be unpercepbble. Detennined to elude the accusations and pat 
responses that seem to plaguedeconstructivecriticism (e.g. thatitisnihilism), 
Kramer is careful inhisengagementof thetextsand traditionsof JX>litical and 
legal theory and maintains an awarelle$ of the necessary implications that 
flow to his own text from such an approach. 
Kramer focuses on three authors and the traditions which surround 
them: G.A Cohen and Marxism via Karl Marx's Theory of History, H.L.A. Hart 
and Legal Positivism via The Concept of Law, and David Hume and 
Conservatism via A Treatise of Human Nature, An Enquiry concerning the 
Principle of Morals, and An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Kramer 
concludes the book with a chapter on Critical Legal Studies, and it is here 
~here his qualified allegiance lies. A brief exegesis on deconstruction 
introduces the book and is quite good in familiarizing the reader with 
Kramer's particularunderstandingofJacquesDerrida' s philosophy. Kramer 
also c?ntinues what seems to be a trend in deconstruction scholarship by 
assertingthatAmericanliteraryaiticshavesomehowmisconstrued Derrida 
andareusinghimfor their own purposes while others, usually philosophers, 
really understand Derrida and his project 
Kramer's basic strategy is to introduce each author and his tradition and 
proceed to give a close reading to a particular text. In doing so, Kramer seeks 
to ~n~age the ~ext on its own terms and JX>int out what incongruencies arise. 
:Ws first reading provides the boundaries by which the textand the tradition 
m which itis situated claim to bean object By spotlighting this boundary and 
the aporia of inn~ and outemess which structure it, Kramer creates the 
space necessary for a strategy of deconstruction, and it is within this space 
that he demonstrates the instability of the alleged boundary and the 
dependence which each side necessarily involves itself. Kramer wants to 
show that this instability is a necessary feature of any text or tradition which 
theorizes about social or political life. He states that "[a]ll positions-be they 
metaphysical or political-will perforcedismantlethemselvesas thecondition 
of their being elaborated. No position, then, can lay claim to thedeterminancy 
and coherence needed to play the part of an element in a necessary relation" 
(p .. 148). What makes this book interesting, however, is what follows this 
claim: "(T]his will be true of deconstructivecritiquesas much as of discourse 
that has les.s explicitly thematiz.ed its undoing" (p. 148). 
Kramer is roncemed to show deoonstruction at work and convince the 
reader ~tit should be employed in the context of legal and political theory. 
To do this he understands (as many do not) that the contradictions inherent 
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in the perfonnance of deconstructive strategies must be accounted for. This 
must be done not apologetically, but forcefully, and as an integral part of the 
critique rather than as an afterthought or footnote. How~ver, in taking. the 
stance of deconstruction without apology, Kramer knowingly steps off into 
anabyss where politics and deconstruction share a relationship of suspici~n. 
Kramer is most explicit about this relationship in that part of the book which 
engages the Critical Legal Studies movement and its adoption of the concept 
of reification as a way of explaining the history of law and legal theory. In 
bringing deconstruction to the legal theory debate, Kramer addresses the 
fundamental i$ue--that abstract literary theory can be of little consequence 
when intervening in matters which involve real people in concrete legal 
cases. Against Marx's distinction between interpreting the world and 
changing it, Kramer responds that "for the . . . deronstructive critic, a 
reinterpreting of the world~ a changing of it" (p. 245). For ~r, "ev~ry 
social practice (as well as every natural phenomenon) compnses ~ynad 
forms of categorization, and hence has always succumbed to a vertiginous 
interplay between sameness and difference" (p. 246). 
In dealing with the thought of G.A Cohen and H.L.A. Hart, Kramer 
tosses the monkeywrench of deconstruction into any gap which presents 
itself as a result of his close reading. Kramer interrupts the boundaries which 
enclose the theories of Cohen and Hart by questioning the very fact of the 
boundaries' existence. Every claim to presence by a theory highlights the 
dyad of innemes.s and outellle$ (and other conceptual pairings needed for 
a systematic theory) and at the same time signals the beginning of the end. 
For Cohen, the distinction between sociality and materiality which he 
develops as a more enrompassing way to theorize Marx's ~value/ 
exchange-value relationship sets up an aporia, which nece~1tates !1'e 
obliteration of this initial distinction. Highlighting the moment of abstraction 
which is required for this description, Kramer goes to work: "'materiality' is 
always already social, in the sense that it can come into view only as a result 
of the procedure (that is, abstraction) which resides at the social end of ~ 
sociality /materiality split" (p. 87). Substitute any two opposed concepts in 
the discourses of legal and political theory and the result is the same-they 
will not hold. In Hart's case, it is the distinction between primary and 
secondary rules and their relation to the rule of recognition that he depends 
upon to make his legal system cohere. Again, Kramer intervenes and the 
result is inevitable. · 
This is not to say that Kramer's book is dull or overly formulaic. In or?er 
to be successful in his strategy, Kramer must in some sense create the object 
of his destruction. Kramer makes the text as systematic and suggestive as~ 
author claims it to be, and points out problems which arise within thiS 
(artificial) sphere. However, once this solidity is established, Kramer does 
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~t l~~eit in pieces after it has undergone the scrutiny of deconstruction. In 
his cntique of Hume's proclivity for privileging the particular over the 
abstractrequirementsof the social compact, Kramer explains why this would 
be impo$ible: 
Acri~queofH~e'spri~~gofparticularswillnotautomaticallyimpairthe 
~veness of his theonzmg, for any such critique will powerfully reconfirm 
uruts m the very process of undermining them; but if the intraphilosophical 
effects are so dizzyingly incalculabl~ then one should hesitate before making 
predictions about politics. (p. 149) 
. :ms hesita~on is ~pable throughout the book, not only in Kramer's 
wnting but also m themmd of a reader who is sympathetic to deconstruction 
and wishes to situate it within a legal or political theory. Having established 
on the level of theory that the moment of deronstruction cannot be denied 
and that all dichotomies necessarily subvert themselves, he exhorts those 
who engage the problems of law and politics to embrace deconstruction as 
? s~ategy in ~eir writing. To Cl$uage the possibility of hesitancy, Kramer, 
tn his analysIS of G.A. Cohen, writes that 
Just as dec~nstruction l~v~ room for speech-act philosophy and structuralism, 
an analySis that has highlighted circularity can leave room for a defense of 
Marxism ~d for a~ reading of history. That such projects will ultimately 
subvert therr own claims, or beg their own questions does not decrease their 
tre~chancy in appropriate contexts-in particular, when they are competing 
against other persuasive versions of historical "truth," which will be subject to 
similar disruptions. (p. 80) 
One immediately wonders when and how a context could arise that did 
~ot involve competing versions of historical "truth." When deconstruction 
IS added to this competition a peculiar ethics presents itself. To what 
advantage does the political or legal theorist introduce deronstructive 
strategi~ int~~ d~te? Although one who enlists such a strategy can offer 
devastating lnSlghts into the traditions one seeks to engage, it remains 
doubtful what effect such insights will have on one's opponents (the use of 
metaphors of battle and struggle pervade Kramer's book). Kramermaintains 
that to take a deconstructive stance allows one to "absorb critiques to which 
0~~' s position must be vulnerable" (p. 268), and because of this he "implores 
Clltical legal scholars to brace their methods by undermining and imperiling 
[them]" (p.269). Hesistancy redux. 
To raise questions about strategy in Kramer's book is not to suggest that 
they ha~e gone overlooked. As Kramer notes: '1t may well tum out that 
upholding novelty against rigidified structures will promote stagnation far 
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more than would a contrary tactic. That, however, seems a gamble_ worth 
taking'' (p. 268). However, this gamble should only be taken with full 
recogrrltion of the stakes. Inverting Derrida's observation that "to sta~ the 
difficulty is not ... to sunnount it'' (p. 268), one should also note that net~ 
has one surmounted the solution by stating it. Although deconstruction 
opens up many avenues for intervention in political and legal theory, both 
sides of the dyads around which deconstruction operates are deeply 
entrenched. This entrenchment has sites both within the academy and 
without. To treat them as "merely'' literary is to seriously weaken the 
possibility of using deconstruction as an effective ~?f interventi?n. 'The 
strength of Kramer's book is that he recogniz.es fl»:s. His .~ose reading of a 
selection of texts which give sustenance to the main traditions of legal and 
political theory is instructive, and should sen:e as a ~r~ mod~ for 
those working within these traditions especially Critical Legal Studies. 
Greg Howard, Lexington 
Barnett Newman&lected Writings and Jnteruiews. Edited by John P. 
O'Neill, Text Notes and Commentary by Mollie McNickle, Introduction 
by Richard Shiff. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990. 
Though Barnett Newman wrote more and more persuasively~ .any 
of his colleagues in the early-'50s school known as Abstract Express1orus,m, 
he still remains perhaps the most misunderstood painter in what was the first 
modem American art movement to free itself in any significant way from 
European tethers. In that we have learned to enter Rothko's col~r .field, 
Pollock's web, or De I<ooning's splashy landscape, we have not assimilated 
Newman into a popular understanding. One can stand in the circular room 
of the National Gallery in D.C. where Newman's fourteen "Stations of the 
Cross" hang, and witness the perplexity coupled with derision that crosses 
viewers' faces as theyencounterthese8-footcanvases, soasceticallyrendei:c1 
that they appear nearly bare, simply "framed" with strips of black or white. 
How does one go about explaining to the uninitiated thatittookNewman43 
years to arrive at this style? One could retaliate in the manner of Ado~ that 
'1f one does not understand something, it is customary to behave with the 
sublime understanding of Mahler's jackass, and project one' sown inadequacy 
on to the object, declaring it to be incomprehensible." But Newman seldom 
took such high ground. Rather,he tried insistently to explain his art and other 
like it to an unfamiliar public and critics alike. Selected Writings offers more 
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than ample insight into the resilient psyche of the man who claimed that to 
understand one of his paintings "would mean the end of an state capitalism 
and totalitarianism" (p. 247). · 
Before Newman painted his seminal "Onement I" in 1948 a maroon 
canvas with one orange stripe, or "zip" down the center-he was a relen~ 
proselytizer for the abstract art movement in America. He claimed it was the 
true American fonn-"barbaric" and primitive, owing nothing to European 
notions of representation, which he claimed were simply derivations of 
classicism. ''For the artist in America has the special privilege of being told 
and reminded every minµte of his state of futility. The world here makes no 
bargain of expediency with him in the name of culture'' (p. 112), wrote 
Newman. Instead, he praised throughout his life the raw sculpture of 
Oceanic and South Sea tribes, with rhetoric that never fell into the racist 
implications of psychic savagery that became popular in lieu of surrealism. 
Rather, Newman emphasiz.ed the "elemental mystery of life" that these 
sculptures sought to embody and combat Primitiveartwasneverdecorative, 
never interested in polished surfaces. Rather it was always totemic, more 
metaphysical, more "intellectual" in its grapplingwith the chaos of nature. 
By examining primitive cultures in the Americas, Newman anived at 
the conviction that rontemporary art had become impotent and styliz.ed 
because it emerged ·from only one tradition--classicism. Newman had 
begun thinking about the "Other" decades before it was vogue in this 
country. 'We are to admit that the emperor has no clothes, N he wrote, "for to 
do so-to admit that primitive art can move us without resorting to the 
sensuous elements to which we are accustomed-may prove to be a denial 
of our Western European aesthetics" (p. 146). 
In the spring of 1945, in a long essay called "The Plasmic Image," 
Newman began seriously to search for a new "language" fu which topaint-
a new beginning separate from Europe. The myth of ''beauty" was obsolete, 
ornamental, "plastic." In light of the horrors that were unfolding in Europe, 
such facile art was unfathomable for Newman. He searched for a "plasmic," 
philosophical fonn that would allow him to exp~ all of the anguish 
primitive people must have felt at the mercy of forces they could not 
comprehend. 
Newman never lost his ambition to express man's relation to the 
transcendental. He simply thought that the European's "relation to the 
Absolute became identified and confused with the absolutisms of perfect 
creations-with the fetish of quality-so that the European artist has been 
continually involved in the moral struggle between notions of beauty and the 
desire for sublimity" (p.171). The crucial question then became for Newman, 
"if we are living in a time without a legend or mythos that can be called 
sublime, if we refuse to admit any exaltation in pure relations, if we refuse to 
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